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Abstract 
Metaphors, domains and embodiment 
Investigations of metaphorical meaning constitution and 
meaning (in-) variance have revealed the significance of 
semantic and semiotic domains and the contexts within which 
they function as basis for the grounding of metaphorical 
meaning. In this article some of the current views concerning 
the grounding of metaphorical meaning in experience and 
embodiment are explored. My provisional agreement with 
Lakoff, Johnson and others about the “conceptual” nature of 
metaphor rests on an important caveat, viz. that this bodily 
based conceptual structure which lies at the basis of linguistic 
articulations of metaphor, is grounded in a deeper ontic 
structure of the world and of human experience. It is the 
“metaphorical” (actually “analogical”) ontological structure of this 
grounding that is of interest for the line of argumentation 
followed in this article.  
Because Johnson, Lakoff and other’s proposal to ground 
metaphorical meaning in embodiment and neural processes is 
open to being construed as subjectivist and materialist, I shall 
attempt to articulate the contours of an alternative theory of 
conceptual metaphor, meaning and embodiment which counter-
acts these possibilities. This theory grounds metaphorical 
meaning and meaning change in an ontological and anthropo-
logical framework which recognises the presence and 
conditioning functioning of radially ordered structures for reality. 
These categorisations in which humankind, human knowledge 
                                           
1 Prof. Elaine M. Botha was also Professor of Philosophy at Redeemder 
University College, Ancaster, Ontario, Canada. 
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and reality participate, condition and constrain (ground) 
analogical and metaphorical meaning transfer, cross-domain 
mappings, and blends in cognition and in language, provide the 
basis for the analogical concepts found in these disciplines. 
Opsomming 
Metafore, betekenisdomeine en beliggaming 
’n Ondersoek na die wyse waarop metaforiese betekenis 
gevorm en gewysig word, het die belangrikheid van semantiese 
en semiotiese domeine, asook die konteks waarbinne dit 
funksioneer as basis vir die begronding van metaforiese 
betekenis, aan die lig gebring. In hierdie artikel word enkele 
huidige pogings ondersoek om metafoorbetekenis te begrond. 
Die voorlopige instemming met Lakoff, Johnson en andere 
aangaande die “konseptuele” aard van metafore berus op ’n 
belangrike voorbehoud, naamlik dat hierdie liggaamlik ge-
baseerde konseptuele struktuur, wat die basis is van die 
linguistiese verwoording van metafore, gegrond is op ’n dieper 
ontiese struktuur van die wêreld en van menslike ervaring. Die 
“metaforiese” (of eintlik die “analogiese”) ontologiese struktuur 
van hierdie begronding is veral belangrik vir die beredeningslyn 
in hierdie artikel.  
Omdat Lakoff, Johnson en andere se voorstel om metaforiese 
betekenis te begrond in beliggaming en neurale prosesse 
sigself daartoe leen om subjektivisties of materieel verklaar te 
word, word in hierdie artikel gepoog om die kontoere van ’n 
alternatiewe teorie oor konseptuele metafore, betekenis en 
beliggaming te ontgin waarin bogenoemde moontlikhede 
uitgeskakel word. Hierdie teorie begrond metaforiese betekenis 
en betekenisverandering in ’n ontologiese en antropologiese 
raamwerk wat die aanwesigheid en bepalende funksionering 
van straalvormig geordende werklikeidstrukture erken. ’n 
Basiese uitgangspunt van die voorgestelde idee van be-
liggaming is ’n ontologie wat die straalvormige, strukturele 
stratifikasies en kategorisering van menslike sisteme, kennis, 
ervaring en werklikheid erken. Hierdie kategoriserings waarin 
die mens, menslike kennis en werklikheid deel het, kon-
disioneer en begrens (begronde) analogiese en metaforiese 
betekenisoordrag, oor-en-weer-kartering van domeine, waar-
nemings- en taalversmelting, en voorsien die basis vir 
analogiese konsepte wat in die verskillende dissiplines 
aangetref word. 
1. The “grounding hypothesis” 
Recent developments in cognitive semantics (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1988:119-154; Johnson, 1987; Johnson, 1993b:61) and cognitive 
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semiotics address the problem of how metaphorical meaning is 
possible through discussions of the “grounding” of metaphorical 
meaning. Where metaphors allow us to understand one domain of 
experience in terms of another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:117), it is 
generally argued or assumed that metaphorical understanding is 
grounded in non-metaphorical understanding (Lakoff & Turner, 
1989:113), an assumption characteristic of most reductionist 
theories of metaphor. The question raised in this article is to what 
extent Lakoff, Johnson and Turner’s move away from grounding 
metaphorical meaning in literal language to autonomous concepts 
grounded in patterns of bodily and social experience, actually solves 
the problem of the grounding of metaphorical meaning without 
succumbing to either subjectivism or materialism. I intend to argue in 
order to escape this trap, that this move to ground metaphorical 
meaning in bodily experience requires a further recognition of the 
ontological and anthropological stratification which conditions 
meaning and meaning variance. Philosophical insights from the 
philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd’s so-called Amsterdam School, 
will be utilised in this analysis. 
1.1 Literal meaning theory is about conventional language 
Lakoff and Turner argue that the literal meaning theory is not about 
concepts but about ordinary, conventional language which is seen to 
be semantically autonomous. Their grounding hypothesis deals with 
concepts as embedded in human experience. They do not deny that 
there are semantically autonomous concepts but claim that 
whatever such concepts, they “... are grounded in our patterns of 
bodily and social experience” (Lakoff & Turner, 1989:119). To these 
issues and the issue concerning the grounding of orientational, 
basic, ontological and structural metaphors they answer that they 
are grounded “... by virtue of systematic correlates within our 
experience” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:58, 61).  
In order for metaphors to allow understanding one domain in terms 
of another, there must be some “... grounding, some concepts that 
are not completely understood via metaphor to serve as source 
domains” (Lakoff & Turner, 1989:135).  
1.2 The problem of grounding the conceptual system 
In the earlier work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980:56) the problem of 
grounding the conceptual system was briefly articulated as follows: 
“Are there any concepts at all that are understood directly, without 
metaphor? If not, how can we understand anything at all?” Concepts 
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that are candidates to be understood directly are plants, departures, 
fire, sleep, locations, seeing, etc.  
Lakoff and Johnson claim that there is a difference between their 
grounding hypothesis and the literal meaning theory. Their 
“grounding hypothesis” which is about concepts and not about 
language, indicates that only some concepts are “semantically 
autonomous”, yet most concepts are not semantically autonomous 
(Lakoff & Turner, 1989:119). In their position the term literal has 
been relegated to be used as handy term either for a source domain 
of a metaphor or to contrast with such terms as “ironic,” 
“understated,” “arrived at by principles of the conversation”, etcetera 
(Lakoff & Turner, 1989:119).  
1.3 The need to differentiate between experience and 
conceptualisation 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980:59) emphasise the need to differentiate 
between experience and the way it is conceptualised and argue that 
“... there are natural dimensions of experience and that concepts 
can be analysed along these dimensions in more than one way” 
(1980:76). Lakoff and Johnson argue that understanding takes place 
in terms of entire domains of experience and not in terms of isolated 
concepts and argue that domains of experience are conceptualised 
as experiential gestalts – structured wholes – that represent a 
coherent organisation of experiences in terms of what is ex-
perienced as “natural kinds of experience” (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980:117). Their analysis of a host of empirical examples leads 
them to their conceptual metaphor theory which assumes the 
existence of these experiential domains. In Philosophy in the flesh 
(1999) where they inter alia deal with the grounding of metaphorical 
meaning, they propose an empirically grounded (responsible) 
philosophy which is not grounded in a priori assumptions. The target 
of their project is the dominant objectivist treatment of language, 
meaning, understanding and reasoning which does not take into 
consideration the bodily experience and figurative process of 
ordering. 
Conceptual metaphor theory has proven to be most useful and 
fertile for the understanding of metaphorical meaning creation. It is, 
however, exactly the architecture of these domains (Brandt, 2000) at 
stake in the processes of cross-domain mapping and meaning 
transfer through metaphor, that requires further exploration. Lakoff 
and Johnson’s understanding of “domains” require closer 
exploration, mainly in order to clarify the nature of domains and to 
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delineate the relationship between conceptual metaphors, the 
experiential gestalts they are based upon and the pre-theoretical 
and pre-conceptual nomic conditions which condition and constrain 
domains.  
2. Conceptual metaphor, embodiment and the 
“grounding hypothesis” 
Conceptual metaphor theory claims that “... the magnificent tool of 
conceptual metaphor” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:233) “... is one of the 
greatest of our intellectual gifts” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:45, 129). 
Metaphors are pervasive both in thought and in language, and in 
human subjective experience in general. A large system of primary 
metaphors is acquired automatically and unconsciously by 
functioning in everyday life. “Because of the way neural connections 
are formed,” Lakoff and Johnson state “... humans all naturally think 
using hundreds of primary metaphors”. They also endorse the view 
which is contrary to long-standing opinion, that primary metaphor is 
not the result of a conscious multistage process of interpretation, but 
is a “... matter of immediate conceptual mappings via neural 
connections” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:57). They (1999:46, 47) 
develop an “integrated theory of primary metaphor” which includes 
four parts: Johnson’s theory of conflation in the course of learning; 
Grady’s theory of primary metaphor; Narayanan’s neural theory of 
metaphor and Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual 
blending.2 Conceptual metaphors are often conventional, they say. 
Lakoff and Johnson differentiate a set of metaphors they call 
“ontological metaphors”. Ontological metaphors are the type of 
metaphor where abstract notions are thought of as concrete entities 
or substances.3 This grounding of primary and conceptual metaphor 
requires closer attention. 
                                           
2 In conceptual metaphor theory metaphors are analysed as stable and 
systematic relationships between two conceptual domains, whereas in blending 
theory, the basic unit of cognitive organisation is not a domain but a “mental 
space” (Fauconnier, 1994:16). Mental space theory is based on the analysis of 
two or more input spaces, based on a generic space shared by both, and 
resulting in a blended space. 
3 The term ontological is also used in the more conventional philosophical sense 
of the word when Lakoff and Johnson analyse Aristotelian categories and 
essences. I use the term ontic to refer to these phenomena. 
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2.1 Bodily nature of cognition and the nature of subjective 
experience 
Lakoff and Johnson’s emphasis of the bodily nature of cognition also 
takes into account the multifaceted nature of the subjective 
experience of the world which forms the basis of analogical and 
metaphorical meaning change and meaning transfer. Their notion of 
embodiment and conceptual metaphor is based on an important 
assumption that “... our corporeality is part of the corporeality of the 
world ...” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:565). The evidence they provide 
is based on extensive empirical analysis of “conceptual metaphor” 
and conceptual domains. When Lakoff and Johnson (1999:462) 
discuss the grounding of conceptual metaphor they argue that 
second-generation cognitive science locates meaning in the body 
and the unconscious conceptual system, and that meaning arises in 
the body and brain through our interactions with the environment 
and with other people (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:463). Cognitive 
semantics studies human conceptual systems, meaning and 
inference and claims that  
... [m]etaphors are products of body, brain, mind, and 
experience, are pervasive in our everyday thought and in 
philosophy itself and get their meaning through the 
commonalities of the body and our bodily and social experience 
in the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:462, 463; 1988).  
Lakoff and Johnson tie this innate human propensity to the 
embodied spirituality of human beings. This in turn comes to 
expression in what they call empathic imaginative projection – a 
form of “transcendence, ... a form of being in the other ...” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999:565) and in “ecological spirituality” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999:566) in the relationship to the physical world. 
“Embodied spirituality” entails that in all acts of imaginative, 
empathic interaction with the world around us an element of what 
has traditionally been called “the spiritual”, is present (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999:565). The fact that the analysis of metaphor leads to 
the recognition of the presence and role of embodied spirituality in 
the process of meaning formation, points to an important dimension 
of the discussion concerning the nature of metaphor, an issue that 
will be dealt with elsewhere. 
2.2 An ontological framework conditioning the “itineraries of 
meaning”  
My provisional agreement with Lakoff, Johnson and others about the 
“conceptual” nature of metaphor rests on an important caveat, viz. 
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that this bodily based conceptual structure which lies at the basis of 
linguistic articulations of conceptual metaphor, is grounded in a 
deeper ontic structure of the world and of human experience. It is 
the “metaphorical” (actually “analogical”) ontological structure of this 
grounding that needs to be “fleshed out” in a more encompassing 
framework. In such a framework the “multi-ordinality” or multi-
facetedness of reality, facts, things, human relationships, events, 
human action, human experience and cognition in diverse domains 
of experience, need adumbration. Such a framework must be able to 
ground the notion of “conceptual metaphor” and meaning in the 
ineradicably relational nature of both human beings and reality and 
in the relationship of human beings in and to reality. In order to 
escape the pitfall of subjectivism such a framework needs to 
accommodate the fact that concepts, conceptual domains and 
metaphors are constrained and conditioned by a deeper, ontological 
framework which conditions the “itineraries of meaning” (Ricoeur, 
1980), which guide and structure the acts of knowing. These 
“itineraries” are not only constitutive of the human mind, but also of 
the nature of the world. In order to escape the trap of materialism, 
such a framework needs to recognise the bodily basis of human 
experience, conceptualisation and language without reducing this to 
its neural and bodily basis.  
2.3 Discerning recurring regulated patterns 
One’s access to these ontic constraints and conditions are by 
means of human embodied experience and through linguistic or 
imaginative articulations. They are not created in these processes. 
Hart (1984) illustrates this point with a good example. If one were to 
fly over a major city and observe the obviously regulated patterns of 
traffic flowing beneath you, you would infer that there are traffic 
rules, and moreover, that these rules have been made by some 
competent body. When we recognise the fact that meaning is 
discerned on the basis of recurring regulated patterns, we are 
dealing with an analogous state of affairs. Discerning regularity and 
pattern and gestalts which constitute the basis of meaning does not 
imply that the meaning was created by the discerner.  
Lakoff and Johnson’s anchoring of meaning in the bodily existence 
falls short of actually recognising that all realms of reality are 
permeated by and pregnant with meaning which the knower in 
community with others opens up and dis-covers via human 
interactive experience. It is exactly this dynamic “... intrinsic 
restlessness and relational insufficiency of reality” (Hart, 1984:166), 
which human action and cognition participate in and which points to 
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the “expressive” and “referential” character of all of reality where “... 
meanings refuse to stand still” (Van Hoozer, 1998:127). Both 
conceptual metaphor and the states of affairs on which it is based in 
reality have this deferral of meaning built into it. Having said this, it 
does not exempt us from the responsibility to track down the 
mechanisms by means of which we approximate such meaning. It is 
to the contours of this notion of “domains” that we now turn. 
3. Domains: structured mush? 
Lakoff (1987:268) recognises that a satisfactory account of meaning 
and meaningful understanding rests on the recognition of the 
structured nature of embodied, human experience. Experientialism, 
Lakoff claims (1987:267), rests on the bodily pre-conceptual form 
from which it arises and this is not “unstructured mush” (Lakoff, 
1987:267). Lakoff says that  
... conceptual structure is meaningful because it is embodied, 
that is, it arises from, and is tied to, our pre-conceptual bodily 
experiences. In short, conceptual structure exists and is 
understood because pre-conceptual structures exist and are 
understood. Conceptual structure takes its form in part from the 
nature of pre-conceptual structures.  
Lakoff and Johnson (1980:117, 118) argue that there are three 
natural kinds of experience: of the body, of the physical 
environment, and of the culture. They regard them as “natural” 
because they are products of human nature (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980:116). There is a relatively small number of conceptual 
metaphors drawing on domains of bodily experience which structure 
abstract human concepts (Johnson, 1989:115). Johnson claims that 
our knowledge is embodied in a deeper and more profound sense 
than mere know-how. Our conceptual system “... is grounded in and 
structured by various recurring patterns of our perceptual 
interactions, bodily orientations, movements and manipulations of 
objects” (Johnson, 1993a:414). He states that this “... corporeal 
semantics, a semantics of embodied understanding” (Johnson, 
1993a:422) actually is constitutive of our cognitive activity and of our 
concepts. So one can conclude that in their view human embodied 
nature and cognition are patterned and orderly, and that this order 
reflects in the concepts formed in and about the world. It is the 
nature of the pre-conceptual reality that needs further reflection.  
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3.1 Metaphors rest on some form of analogy 
Metaphors always rest on some form or sort of analogy that relates 
to differences and/in similarities, albeit within domains or between 
different domains. Metaphors are not only lingual articulations of 
purported interactive meanings between two different semantic 
domains or between differences and similarities within one domain, 
but are also typical of thought processes about the world. They 
express more than merely lingual states of affairs, but rely on ontic 
categories, (natural) kinds and image schemata, and in turn “create” 
(Fauconnier, 1994) domains or “mental spaces”. Image schemata 
are pre-conceptual experiences that occur constantly in everyday 
life, e.g. orientations and relations (up-down, part-whole, centre-
periphery, etc. – Lakoff, 1987:267). 
3.2 Domains and mental spaces not only creations of the 
human mind 
There is no doubt that the human mind is actively involved and 
creative in the process of uncovering and opening up new domains. 
The recognition of this creative act needs not commit one to a 
position in which the existence of these domains are ascribed 
primarily to the outcomes of neural mechanisms. That our 
recognition and knowledge of such domains are based on effective 
neural processes requires little argument, but this does not point to 
the neural origin of such domains. The tendency toward 
transcendence mentioned above is an indication that even in our 
most creative and imaginative moments we succeed only in gaining 
limited in-sight into a part of the deep and unfathomable complexity 
of meaning which precedes our cognitive or linguistic grasp and 
which seems always to be unfolding more layers and depths of 
meaning. A reading, which ultimately attributes “domains” and 
“mental spaces” to creations of the human mind does not satisfy, 
because in this view, meaning is merely the result of human physical 
and mental processes. All these processes play a significant role in 
meaning creation and change, but fail to provide an adequate and 
convincing grounding of meaning. Meaning and metaphorical 
meaning can not be a bootstrap operation in which all resources of 
meaning are only embedded in the subject or in the material, neural 
basis. On the contrary, meaning is presupposed when human actors 
interact with the world. It is to the possible structure of this 
presupposed meaning that we now turn. 
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4. Domain theories 
The early relatively simple definition of metaphor as the 
understanding of one domain of experience in terms of another 
domain of experience raised a fundamental question: What are 
“domains of experience”? (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:117; Brandt, 
2000:12). The notion of a domain is found in the earliest literature on 
metaphor, e.g. in terms like source domain and target domain but is 
not explicitly defined. Brandt (2000:11-51) shows that a few authors 
(Lakoff & Johnson, Turner, Sweetser) have done work in this area, 
but argues that no adequate account of domains has yet been 
developed. He then proceeds to develop an “architecture of 
semantic domains as grounding hypothesis in cognitive semiotics” 
(see Brandt, 2000). This proposal is preceded by Eve Sweetser’s 
(1990:19) analysis of semantic change and polysemy patterns in 
which she introduces at least four systematic metaphorical 
connections between domains: social, physical, mental and speech 
acts. Sweetser (1990:19) states the following: 
Metaphor operates between domains. It operates so per-
vasively that speakers find an inter-domain connection between 
knowledge and vision, or between time and space, to be as 
natural as the intra-domain connection between finger and hand 
or between man and woman. 
4.1 Per Aage Brandt’s proposals 
Per Aage Brandt (2000) presents a “geography of the life-world” and 
provides an “architecture of semantic domains as a grounding 
hypothesis in cognitive semiotics” (see Brandt, 2000). He claims that 
we are embodied according to different basic domains of reality and 
calls for a return to the inaugural studies of metaphor and shows 
that “metaphor concepts are superordinate semantic indicators of 
domain addresses” (Brandt, 2000:48). In his “first life-world map” he 
distinguishes a total of four basic gesture-based semantic domains: 
the physical, the social, the mental, and the speech-act domains 
(D1, D2, D3 and D4) and three action-based  satellite or practical 
domains: work, love and worship (D5, D6 and D7). To this he adds a 
second and third satellite generation of domains that are 
exchanged-based (D8-D10): jurisdiction, economic exchanges, 
aesthetic evaluations in cultural life, and three fundamental genres 
of discourse (D11-D13): argumentative, narrative and descriptive 
(Brandt, 2000:45). This approach chooses gesture, action, 
exchange and discourse as the four main categorisations of 
domains. To what extent such a categorisation is productive of 
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actual insight into the process of meaning creation obviously 
depends on the type of problems it is able to solve or the number of 
approaches it can accommodate. I avoid a critical discussion of 
these two approaches in order to give attention to an alternative 
which accommodates the idea of ontic conditions basic to the 
distinction of domains and meaning. 
We now have a number of arguments that allude to the existence of 
some ontological, experiential and/or embodied grounding of 
metaphorical meaning and meaning change. These positions have 
in common that they deny the existence of a “... rock-bottom core of 
literal concepts to which all meaning or conceptual structure can be 
reduced”, yet do suggest some basic experiential grounding 
(Johnson, 1993a:421). It is about the nature of the embodied 
experiential grounding that views diverge. Obviously all three sets of 
proposals above have merit and share one common denominator, 
that is, their approach to the grounding of metaphorical meaning 
from the angle of cognitive linguistics and cognitive semantics 
(Brandt would prefer to call it cognitive semiotics).  
Brandt’s proposals have a continental philosophical flair which 
reminds strongly of Husserlian phenomenological (life-world) roots, 
but his analyses are very much in the style of cognitive linguistics 
with its close attention to sentence structure and meanings of single 
concepts. Brandt has left “domain theory” behind and wants to work 
with “mental spaces” (along the lines of Fauconnier), presumably 
grounding the nature of meaning in the mental capacities of human 
beings.  
Brandt’s (2000) proposal and methodology of an architecture of 
semantic domains recognises the bodily basis of semantic domains 
and multi-modal gestalts (Brandt, 2000:19), and develops a 
taxonomy of domains in the proposed “first life-world map” (Brandt, 
2000:13). His appeal to the “life world” is an important step in the 
right direction as is the proposal of Lakoff and Johnson to ground 
metaphorical meaning in experiential gestalts and human 
embodiment. It is true that meaning comes to expression in a variety 
of speech acts, facts, events, things, societal relationships, etcetera 
and that all incorporate some form of metaphorical language.  
4.2 Lakoff and Johnson’s emphasis – embodied realism 
Lakoff and Johnson’s emphasis on embodiment as the basis of 
meaning is a choice for an anthropocentric grounding. They claim 
that it is mistaken to think that the spatial relations our conceptual 
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system relies upon and which we take for granted, are just 
“... objectively given features of the external world” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999:575). They argue that we make the best of what our 
brain and our visual system offer us of this world. In this quote, as in 
other sections of the 1999 major work of Lakoff and Johnson, 
embodied realism locates metaphorical meaning in the body, the 
brain and the neurological functioning of the human brain. Their view 
seems to lack recognition of the stratified nature of non-human 
reality, which correlates with the stratification of human embodied 
experience. They locate and explain metaphorical polyvalence on 
the basis of embodiment without recognising the pre-given ontic 
basis for this multivalence. Metaphorical polyvalence still requires 
some deeper ontological grounding, certainly more than grounding 
merely in human mental capacities. 
There is also another important dimension of metaphorical meaning 
that is not adequately addressed in these approaches: a certain type 
of conceptual metaphor expresses the analogical radial structure of 
meaning harboured in diverse aspects of reality. There is a need for 
a theory that explains the fact that this type of conceptual metaphor 
embodies, what Clouser (1991:215) calls “aspectual universality”. 
This is the phenomenon that in all domains all other domains seem 
to be echoed or reflected.  
4.3 The concept of radial structure  
An important clue to both the problem of conceptual and 
metaphorical multivalence and polysemy on the one hand, and the 
ontological bases for aspectual universality, is to be found in the 
idea of the “radial structure” of categories. This concept of radial 
structure as I propose to use it, differs from the way it is used by 
Lakoff and Johnson: Radial structure should not to be seen as 
predominantly a conceptual matter, but primarily and ontological 
(actually “ontic”) matter. Reality, both in its entitiary and aspectual 
existence, reflects the diverse coherence of meaning nuances. It is 
the ontological assumptions of such a conception of domain 
grounding of knowledge4 and metaphor that requires further fleshing 
out. I propose to deal with this in the next section. In this section I 
have broken with the “double-language thesis” and its conventional 
grounding of meaning in the literal. It has also broken with an 
understanding of embodied realism which denies that we live and 
                                           
4 The idea of a domain was mentioned by Lakoff in 1987. 
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experience a world “given” to us. There is no “earthly world”-in-itself, 
but only one that stands in a “concentric relationship” (Dooyeweerd, 
1955:549) to humankind.5 But this view cannot imply that all facets 
of reality and all human experience of reality can ultimately be 
grounded in neural processes or human embodiment. 
5. Cross-domain mappings and radial categories 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980:117) answered the question concerning 
the nature of domains of experience by referring to “natural kinds of 
human experience”. They (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:117, 118) argue 
that there are three natural kinds of experience viz. “experiences of 
the body, of the physical environment, and of the culture”. They 
constitute the source domains upon which metaphors draw. 
Understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of experience 
and not in terms of isolated concepts. They indicate that “domains of 
experience” are structured wholes within recurrent human 
experience that are organised as experiential gestalts. These 
experiences seem to be natural kinds of experience in the sense 
that they are products of human nature (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980:117). Some of these experiences may be universal and others 
vary from culture to culture. In their later work, Philosophy in the 
flesh (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) “domains” are not explicitly defined. 
In their view of “cross-domain mapping” and “radial categorisation” 
(or “radial structure”) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:177, 224, 225, 233, 
500, 501, 512), one finds an indication of what this idea of “domains” 
actually entails.     
Lakoff and Johnson (1999:77) state that the empirical results of the 
work of second-generation cognitive science led to the 
abandonment of the key assumptions of Anglo-American 
“cognitivism”. Two kinds of evidence were provided by this new 
research: 
                                           
5 This calls forth a number of philosophical issues which can not be dealt with in 
this article. Within the tradition of  Reformational Christian philosophy there has 
been a significant difference between the positions of Stoker and Dooyeweerd 
(1957:74, 75) on this matter: The former argues that all realms (inanimate, 
vegetative, animate and human realms) have their own intrinsic meaning and 
relationship to God. Dooyeweerd on the other hand, argues for an 
anthropocentric, (con-)centring of reality in human embodiment and relations. 
This stance in turn is grounded in the transcendent and transcendental a priori 
structure of reality which conditions human experience and makes human 
experience and knowledge possible (Dooyeweerd, 1955:548). 
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(1) a strong dependence of concepts and reason on the 
body and 
(2) the centrality to conceptualization and reason of 
imaginative processes, especially metaphor, imagery, 
metonymy, prototypes, frames, mental spaces, and 
radial categories.   
Basic-level conceptualisation is the cornerstone of “embodied 
realism”, they say (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:74-93). Metaphorical 
language is a reflection of metaphorical thought. Metaphorical 
thought in the form of cross-domain mappings is primary; 
metaphorical language is secondary” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:123). 
To this they add (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:543) “... metaphors ground 
abstract concepts through cross-domain mappings using aspects of 
our embodied experience ... Metaphors are the very means by 
which we can understand abstract domains and extend our 
knowledge into new areas.” 
5.1 Different domains 
The term domain is used to indicate domains of conceptual 
metaphors, linguistic domains, semantic domains, domains of 
experience, etc. “Cross domain conceptual mapping” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999:71) is described as a “cognitive mechanism” which is 
based on the existence of “conceptual metaphor”, an embodied 
system of “basic-level concepts” that “... have evolved to ‘fit’ the 
ways our bodies, over the course of evolution, have been coupled to 
our environment“ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:91). Each metaphorical 
idea which is binary and not unitary harbours a cross domain 
mapping – “... it has both a source and a target that is at least partly 
structured by that source“ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999:255). 
Fundamental to the domains are categories and prototypes. A 
prototype is the most central, or typical instance of a category. 
Whereas “radial categories” are extensions of the prototype, they 
are less “typical”, and may differ from the prototype in one or more 
features.  
5.2 A radial category has one central case 
In a radial category there is one central case and the others are 
extensions of the central one. The example which they use to 
illustrate this is “harm”. The central kind of harm is physical, but 
there is also emotional, financial and social harm which form 
metaphorical extensions of the central case. They may represent 
metaphorical extensions of the prototype (as in “harm”), or 
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alternatively, categories that are missing one or more features 
associated with the prototype (as in “mother”). Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999:224) claim that our very concept of causation is multivalent: it 
consists of the entire radial structure, with human agency at the 
centre and many extensions. The word “causation”, they say 
“... designates a human category, a radial category of extraordinary 
complexity”. We have a central prototypical case of what “causation” 
is in our physical experience of for example being punched in the 
arm, but, Lakoff and Johnson (1999:233) argue, “the question is, 
however, problematic just about everywhere else, because we are 
moving away from the central prototypical case of causation to other 
very different senses with different logics and different criteria for 
determining what is true”. Thus causality differentiates according to 
a great variety of contexts or aspects of human experience and 
reality.  
The above-mentioned differentiation according to a variety of 
contexts raises the question concerning differentiation between the 
(centrally prototypical) meaning of causality and the differentiated 
analogical meanings of causality which are found within the radius of 
the domain inhabited by the prototypical case. How is this 
determined? Some ontological distinctions found in the philosophy 
of Herman Dooyeweerd are helpful in this respect.  
6. Experiential and embodied domains: an alternative 
view 
The alternative view of the domains and radial categories involved in 
experience and embodiment proposed in this section of the article is 
based upon basic distinctions found in the Philosophy of the 
Cosmonomic Idea of Herman Dooyeweerd (cf. 1953; 1955 and 
1957). The following are some of the distinctions most relevant to 
the topic under discussion: 
• All entities in reality and human experience function in a diversity 
of mutually coherent but irreducible aspects or facets of reality – 
also called modal or functional domains. 
• This diversity of coherent but mutually irreducible modal domains 
exhibit both similarities-in-differences and differences in their 
similarities – also called modal or functional analogies. 
• Analysis of the world around us rests on the identification and 
distinction of these similarities and differences exhibited by 
entities and/or aspects or facets of entities. 
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• Concept formation rests on the identification of such similarities 
and differences in which features that have been identified and 
distinguished are united in a concept. 
The quest for a literal grounding of meaning associated with the 
double-language thesis needs to be replaced by a grounding of 
meaning in the distinction between non-analogical (or original) 
modal meaning juxtaposed to analogical modal meaning. 
On the basis of these assumptions it is important to differentiate 
clearly between the standard usage of the term metaphor as found 
in theories about poetry, prose and literature, and the more 
sophisticated way in which it is often used in metaphor theory where 
it indicates deeper ontological, orientational and structural states of 
affairs. The latter type of metaphors inevitably incorporate some 
form of ontic analogy. In order to differentiate the conventional 
understanding of metaphor from conceptual metaphors and a 
deeper type of ontological (ontic) “metaphor” a provisional distinction 
between metaphor and analogy is introduced.  
6.1 Metaphor and analogy 
Metaphor indicates any statement or utterance which understands 
some concrete domain of human experience and reality in terms of 
another concrete domain of experience and reality. Concrete entities 
can be any fact, thing, event, action and societal relationship. So for 
example “education is gardening,” “therapy is archeological 
excavation” or “parental love is a never ending stream”, “the state is 
a system” are examples of metaphors relating two (concrete) 
entities, even though some of the source or target domains are 
actually “abstract” in the conventional sense of the word. This 
distinction is based on one in which two kinds of “domains” can be 
discerned: entitiary domains and modal or functional domains.6 The 
focal analogical moment which is often the “point” of a metaphor is 
embedded in the semiotic radius and/or semantic field of an ontic 
                                           
6 With this distinction in place the notion of metaphor becomes more refined and 
requires further specification when used within the context of the systematic 
distinctions of Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Also Strauss (1988: 
diagram 3) distinguishes between metaphors and analogies on the following 
basis: Metaphors are linguistic in nature and are entitiary analogies that pertain 
to similarities and differences between entities in reality, whereas similarities 
and differences between aspects of reality are indicative of modal analogies that 
come to expression in the elementary basic concepts of disciplines. I have one 
caveat to this definition: “metaphor” does not only need to be linguistic in nature 
(cf. Botha, 1988). 
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domain. So for example one can discern different emphases or foci 
in the use of the term system. A metaphor in which an organic 
system like a plant is utilised in the target domain would accentuate 
the biotic analogical element in the relationship, whereas a 
mechanical system metaphor accentuates the mechanical analogy. 
To use “mental space” theory here, one could say that the “blended 
space” which comes to expression in the metaphor of an organic 
system differs from the blended space resulting from the use of the 
mechanical-system metaphor. The main reason for this is the fact 
that in the actual input space-“system” the (analogical) moments in 
the two examples mentioned are configured differently because of a 
different analogical focus. 
Analogies express the a-similarity-in-difference or differences-in- 
similarities, between two concrete entities. Entities can be any fact, 
thing, event, action or social (societal) relationship. These analogical 
relationships are often mediated by and articulated in lingual 
metaphors. Not only is there an infinite number of potential 
analogies present in any such relationship, but some are already 
known as existing and recognisible analogical elements, whereas 
others are “created” in the course of the opening up of the potential 
analogies present in the semiotic radius and/or semantic field of the 
domains in which the analogy occurs. “Analogy”, in this philo-
sophical approach, indicates a relationship between aspects, facets 
or dimensions (also called “properties” or “irreducible kinds of 
functionality” – Hart, 1984:149 ff.) of concrete entities. Examples of 
such modal analogies are “economic growth”, “social distance”, 
”psychological stress”, “political movement”, etcetera. These 
analogies are anchored to or moored in irreducible kinds of 
functionality which constitute the semantic domains that anchor or 
ground meaning and also form the basis of the multiplicity of 
meanings that metaphors and analogies reveal.  
7. The Principle of Aspectual universality  
Dooyeweerd (1954) differentiates between different types of 
mutually cohering but irreducible (origin-al) domains in reality and 
human experience. In each one of the irreducible aspects or facets 
of reality and of human experience the whole spectrum of other 
domains is mirrored and comes to expression in the process of 
concept formation. Every human act (thing, fact, event, entity, 
societal relationship) in principle exhibits all these (and most 
probably more) aspects or facets either passively or actively. In each 
one of these dimensions all of the rest of reality is reflected or 
echoed. This process is called the “Principle of Aspectual 
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universality” (Clouser, 1991:215). A possible metaphorical image to 
portray this process of reflection or echoing is the result of a prism 
breaking up unified white light into the spectrum of rainbow colours. 
One could also speak of the “focal hues” of white light. 
Each irreducible ontic domain is characterised by an original7 or 
non-analogical modal nucleus or kernel – the most basic common 
denominator or irreducible core (Hart, 1984:157) for the type of 
functioning characteristic of that aspect of reality. One is tempted to 
say this meaning nucleus is the “literal” core, but the fact that this 
core expresses itself via analogical relationships rules out this 
language use. For example, the (origin-al) meaning nucleus of the 
economic mode of reality could be formulated as “frugality”, whereas 
the meaning nucleus of the spatial aspect would be “continuous 
extension” and that of the aesthetic aspect as “allusiveness”, 
etcetera (Seerveld, 1980:131). Every thing, fact, event, act and 
societal relationship can be approached from any one of these 
modal angles and the active or passive presence of this aspect can 
be discerned in all of reality and human experience. The “modalities” 
or functional aspects “... form a modal framework in which we grasp 
concrete phenomena from different points of view” (Dooyeweerd, 
1954 as translated by Knudsen). What makes this modal core or 
nucleus remarkable is the fact that it can only come to expression 
via a vast number of analogical elements. Thus in effect a 
multiplicity of potential and embryonic hierarchically ordered 
meanings is already present in the core or origin-al or non-
analogical meaning of an irreducible aspect of reality (not only of 
human experience).  
7.1 Substrate modalities are assumed in analogical concepts 
In analogical concepts the preceding aspects (substrate modalities) 
are assumed and subsumed, for example, one cannot say space 
without implying that this concept also entails number/countability. 
One cannot use any concepts that refer to movement without 
implicitly assuming or implying both space and number. Things that 
move occupy space and can be counted. These are necessary 
conditions (cf. Hart, 1984:159). One cannot use the concept social 
without assuming the analogical elements of other aspects. It 
presupposes space, discrete quantity, countability, movement, 
logically discrete identity and difference, communication via 
                                           
7 “Original is the qualifier of a term used to indicate univocally the irreducible, non-
analogical core nature of a functional mode” (Hart, 1984:161). 
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language formulated in concepts, sentences, historical/cultural 
formation, etcetera.  
7.2 The possibility of opening up dormant aspects 
Implicit in such concepts are also the possibilities of interactively 
opening up passive aspects that are dormant (projections?) of other 
subjects or objects. These projections are related to human 
experience and possibilities, i.e., perceivability, quantifiability, 
economic exploitation, ethical evaluation, etcetera. Thus a physical 
entity like a piece of rock (gold) can be mined as international 
economic commodity, but it can also be developed in precious 
jewelry (aesthetic) or be presented as a token of love (ethical troth). 
The last three examples demonstrate the way in which 
dormant/passive aspects of a rock are interactively opened up by 
human (normative) intervention. The peculiar characteristic of the 
aspectual nucleus is the fact that it colours an aspect of reality and 
in turn reflects the full scope of the inter-modal coherence of the 
irreducible aspects of reality. Lakoff and Johnson would attribute 
these potential and dormant functions which conceptual metaphors 
can actively open up, to the human embodied experience. Obviously 
that is true, but the fact remains that these non-human entities 
intrinsically possess these potential qualities and or properties that 
can be un-covered through human experience. 
Causality in its origin is a physical phenomenon, but can be seen 
from a great diversity of vantage points. From a legal perspective 
legal causality (who is legally to blame) implies an analogical 
relationship (or cross-domain “mapping”) between the physical and 
juridical domain. From an ethical perspective the ethical analogy of 
“ethical causality” (who is morally guilty), and from a social 
perspective the social analogy or “social causality” (social 
responsibility, e.g. an impaired driver), represent cross-domain 
mappings. This example can be expanded to include the economic 
analogy, ”economic causality” (costs of the accident), etcetera. The 
radial categories within the physical domain thus show an original 
(or non-analogical) and analogical use of concepts demonstrated by 
the notion of causality. Obviously such analogical refractions of a 
core origin-(al) meaning reflect a multiplicity of possible domains and 
cross-domain mappings, and these domains are in turn grounded in 
the experience of embodied persons. 
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8. Personhood: A stratified embodiment 
In the creative and interpretive interaction with the world embodied 
human experience provides the basic experiential gestalts, image 
schemata and conceptual metaphors that make up the framework 
which functions as scaffolding for the network of meanings which 
language and specifically conceptual metaphor reveal. The way 
these cognitive abilities function point to an irreducibly stratified 
embodiment of both the cognitive agent and the world she is 
cognitively interacting with. The challenge is to demonstrate how the 
conditions for this irreducibly stratified reality is recognised, 
discovered or approximated by the agent (and not created by the 
agent) and how it constrains metaphorical meaning and meaning 
change. This recognition requires an understanding of embodiment8 
which correlates to the purported contours of stratified, irreducible 
dimensions of reality. This view implies a view of personhood which 
acknowledges the stratified embodiment of the whole, integral 
human person in his/her relationship to himself, others, cultural 
artifacts, the nonmaterial, vegetative and animal worlds and 
ultimately to what he or she believes to be God or a deity. 
Human personhood is centred in an integral embodied existence 
which manifests more than what has traditionally been called the 
“body”, i.e. only the physico-chemical, biotic and sensitive 
dimensions of human existence. Acts performed by the human 
person always involve the full “soul-bodied person” in whose 
activities one is able to discern a great diversity of aspects or facets 
and complex levels of structures. All human acts are enacted by the 
full integrated person (not only by bodies, souls or minds or spirits). 
These actions take place within the limits of the constraints set by a 
great diversity of aspects, facets or functions of human life and 
reality. This notion of personhood aims to overcome the soul-body 
dichotomy/dualism, the subject-object divide, the body-conscious-
ness (mind) opposition, and aims at avoiding the trap of seeing 
cognition primarily as representation, and truth as correspondence 
with reality. It also grounds embodiment in the transcendental 
conditions that make its existence possible. It postulates at least four 
different overlapping “bodily” structures that presuppose one another 
and that are simultaneously involved in all human acts (Johnson 
[1991] refers to a similar state of affairs but calls it “overlapping 
patterns”).  
                                           
8 Cf. Tim Rohrer’s summary of the tenfold meanings of embodiment (Rohrer, 
2001: 1.49 82). Cf. also Rohrer (2005). 
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The way full-bodied humans interact with the world around them 
sets the stage for an alternative understanding of the interactive 
nature of human knowledge and the inter-domain relationships to 
which metaphors refer. These irreducible domains of embodied 
humankind are interlaced: each having its own identity but also 
building on one another and depending on one another. These 
irreducible domains are the physico-chemical (inorganic), the biotic 
(organic), vegetative, the physico-chemical, psychic (sensitive), and 
the human act structure which incorporates all normative 
dimensions of human existence and is open ended in the sense that 
the acts it produces can be qualified in a multiplicity of possible 
ways.  
8.1 Each domain forms the substrate for the domain “above” 
it  
Each one of these irreducible domains forms the substrate for the 
domain “above” it. This “hierarchy implies that the neural grounding 
of metaphorical meaning is an essential and constitutive basis of all 
other forms of meaning, e.g. linguistic meaning presupposes 
sensitive, organic and physico-chemical substrates. Social 
communication in turn presupposes the bases just mentioned and 
also human lingual and cultural abilities. Even though these 
constitutive bases can be discerned in all metaphorical construals of 
meaning, metaphorical meaning cannot be reduced to its material 
neural basis. 
The alternative approach suggested in this article counteracts 
subjectivism and materialism in the following ways:  
• By recognising the irreducibility of domains in reality and the 
irreducibility of different act structures within human embodiment 
it avoids any form of reductionism.  
• By acknowledging the radial structure of these irreducible 
domains recognition is given to the intrinsic coherence of all 
spheres of reality which in turn rules out absolutist claims that 
ground meaning only in one dimension of reality.  
• In final instance the irreducibility of domains appealed to and 
demonstrated above as “grounding” for metaphorical meaning 
acquire their universal meaning stability from the fact that they 
are conditioned by a design plan or order. 
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